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The paper relies on empirical evidence from Estonia and Slovakia to develop an 
understanding of populism as a performative and transgressive political performance. We 
argue that populism cannot be defined in ideological terms nor can it be attached to 
particular political subjects. Instead, it is a political style that can be adopted and 
mimicked by various subjects from extreme right to social liberal. The performativity of 
populism presupposes forms of transgression that disrupt the normalcy of political 
routine.  Populist performances thus seek and construct an authenticity by taking politics 
outside of its conventional institutional frameworks. We examine the cases of EKRE in 




This paper intends to juxtapose and compare with each other the political effects 
of the populist rhetoric and imagery in two affected countries, Estonia and Slovakia. We 
look at these two cases as representing, correspondingly, Baltic and Central European 
experiences of populist politics that cause divisive effects upon the societies and reinforce 
hybrid forms of political coalitions within the elites. We discuss the reverberations of 
populism from the perspective of performativity, a concept that connotes a rhetorical 
strategy and the multiplicity of its representations in mass culture, media and popular 
arts. It is through this prism that new societal divisions and cleavages might be 
researched, and new political hybridities unpacked. 
Slovakia and Estonia might be compared with each other based on a number of 
parameters. First, they are geographically and demographically small countries at the 
EU's eastern border, with a self-perception of smallness as part of identity discourses that 
engenders a particular sense of liminality. Being located at geopolitical margins, they 
share widely spread feelings of vulnerability that are compensated by their institutionally 
embedded commitments to Western-led political and security frameworks. 
  Secondly, Estonia and Slovakia used to be part of several colonial / imperial 
projects (Austro-Hungarian/Soviet for Slovakia, Swedish / German / Russian / Soviet for 
Estonia). In Slovakia, in the 19th century there was the Hungarian colonial project aimed 
at attempts to Hungarize Slovaks and other non-Magyar ethnic groups in the Kingdom of 
Hungary. The echoes of that project still provokes tensions between Slovakia and 
Hungary though anti-Hungarian rhetoric was shelved away by populists in recent years, 
especially following the migration crisis, which provided them with a new enemy. The 
second colonial project is the Soviet/Communist one (1948-1989), and here differences 
with Estonia may be notable. While in Estonia occupation is ostensibly the dominant 
interpretation of that period, in Slovakia the Communist era is seen somewhat more 
positively, as it was a period of urbanization, industrialization, and general improvement 
in living standards.  
  Thirdly, the two countries’ trajectories of integration into the EU and NATO seem 
to be similar, though Slovakia was a “laggard '' among the Visegrad Four owing to Meciar’s 
authoritarian leadership. But it’s also true that (partially as a result of that fear of the Self)1 
-  it became the most pro-European state in the Visegrad group, the only one to adopt the 
euro, whilst Estonia was also the first one among the Baltic states to introduce the 
common currency – through austerity measures and in the midst of the European 
financial crisis. These similarities between the two cases are paralleled by another shared 
tendency which is the notable growth of anti-establishment performative populism. This 
suggests that both countries have an increased demand for politics that challenges or runs 
contrary to the liberal, pro-Western achievements, hinting at deep divisions and 
dislocations existing in the respective societies.  
  Relatedly, Estonia and Slovakia appear to have similar structure of national 
political landscapes: in both countries presidents embody a spirit of liberal democracy, 
while parliaments are under a serious influence of illiberal populists. The two female 
presidents are a remarkable point of comparison since rhetoric of both might be 
considered as a form of benign (liberal or “elvish”) populism. 
 The research puzzle we try to tackle stems from the vagueness of the concept of 
populism that looks academically overstretched and politically judgmental. On the one 
hand, the frequent associations with right wing extremism made populism a negatively 
marked notion. On the other hand, some left academics (in particular, Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Muffe) infused much more positive connotations to populism that in their 
                                               
1 By ‘fear of the Self’ here we mean that the experience of authoritarianism - which made 
Slovakia an outlier in Central Europe and almost cost the Slovaks their membership in the EU 
and NATO - produced a feeling of insecurity, an implicit fear that authoritarian and pro-Russian 
tendencies could resurface if Slovakia was not firmly anchored in Western alliances. For more 
see Kazharski, Aliaksei. Two kinds of small? The ‘EU core’ in Slovak and Czech geopolitical 
imagination.Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Volume 27, Issue 4, 2019, pp. 424-
438.  
interpretation is an intrinsic component of democracy. This plurality of barely 
reconcilable approaches is complemented by the striking diversity of populist personas 
themselves: among them one may find ‘upstarts from the people’ (such as Aliaksandr 
Lukashenka in Belarus), but also members of the corporate elite (Donald Trump). How 
then can we salvage the concept of populism from the potential fragmentation and likely 
dispersal, and maintain its academic integrity? Arguably, one of possible responses to this 
challenge might consist in approaching populism not from the position of its actors’ 
alleged belongingness to - or embeddedness in - a specific class or ideology, but from the 
vantage point of their performative resources that might be widely shared and borrowed 
from each other all across the political spectrum.     
Therefore, unlike many other studies grounded in attributing populism to concrete 
and easily identifiable actors, we in our analysis approach populism as a performative 
style rather than an ideologically marked or politically substantialist construct. What 
stems from this key point is that any specific issue or policy strategy might take populist 
and non-populist (this is to say, policy-based / managerial / administrative / 
technocratic) forms. For example, the strategy of sustaining and reinforcing national 
identity might be implemented through language and citizenship policy, as well as 
through public - and largely symbolic - actions aimed against foreigners. 
 By the same token, it is the performative approach to populism that seems to be 
instrumental for understanding the proliferation of hybrid political practices. Examples 
are  an ‘unthinkable’ coalition of mutually exclusive parties in the Estonian government 
after April 2019; or a populist melange of “left and right-wing ideologies, e.g. the founding 
of a national commercial bank and radical tax reductions at the same time”2; or intricate 
combinations of globalization / cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and the retrieval of 
archaic cultural / political forms, on the other. Hybridized populism in this sense is a 
socially contagious phenomenon, and fosters convergence of political styles between 
political opponents: in both countries we have identified cases of the populist style 
performed by liberal actors, which only proves the trans-ideological character of populism 
that enacts and empowers different political subjectivities.3 
         Methodologically, populist performativity ought to be distinguished from political 
campaigning that involves a great deal of affective and expressive tools. The reason for 
this limitation is that during electoral campaigns all their participants are structurally 
forced to adhere to the populist modus operandi by the sheer nature of electoral 
democracy. This is why we prefer to mostly focus on the “regular” situations not directly 
affected by electoral considerations. This distinction we draw between campaigning - 
when almost everybody tends to be a populist - and regular politics explains our selection 
                                               
2 Liivik, Ero: Right-wing extremism and its possible impact to the internal security of the Republic 
of Estonia. In: Proceedings, Estonian Academy of Security Studies (2015). pp. 83-116 (98) 
3 Angelos Kissas. Performative and ideological populism: The case of charismatic leaders on 
Twitter, Discourse and Society 2019, p.2; doi.org/10.1177/0957926519889127 
of political parties in the respective countries. Our analysis thus focused on the activities 
of those political actors that are known for their performative style outside of the 
campaign period.   
We also choose our reference period based on these methodological assumptions 
of the difference between “regularity” and the campaign mobilization season. As we 
address two countries with different electoral cycles, the time frames for the two cases will 
necessarily be decoupled. For Estonia it started in April 2019 when the coalition 
government with the participation of EKRE (Estonian Conservative People’s Party) was 
formed, thus commencing a new era in Estonian politics with populists in power. Slovakia 
experienced a similar event three years earlier. In 2016 several right-wing populist parties 
made a breakthrough in the national parliamentary elections, as the migration crisis 
radicalized public discourse and created additional discursive opportunities for new 
players.4 We, naturally, do not claim that populist politics did not exist in the respective 
countries outside of these time frames. As a political style populism is always an option, 
but these specific reference periods were selected in light of the electoral cycles in both 
countries and the availability of data which depends directly on them.  
In terms of data gathering our analysis has relied primarily on official websites of 
the respective political parties, as well as social network pages of their most influential 
members, and also on reports by the local media provided within the reference period. 
Since performative political action by its very nature tends to draw increased media 
attention and resonate with the public strongly, documenting its main instances was not 
particularly difficult.  
  
Performative Populism: Introducing the Concept 
Most of the attempts to define populism in essentialized categories are usually 
misleading and counter-productive. An example could be the misrepresentation of 
populists as those political actors who allegedly „a) see the ostensible cleavage between 
“ordinary people” and “the elites” as the only one that matters; b) reject compromise; and 
c) dismiss minorities and disregard institutional legality while favoring raw 
majoritarianism“5. We consider all these points useful in some respects but also 
questionable, as they do not, in our opinion, fully comprehend the nature of the 
phenomenon. Instead we prefer to approach „populism as a distinctive political and 
communicative ‘practice’ that „is actually present in the language of almost all political 
                                               
4 See A. Kazharski. The End of ‘Central Europe’? The Rise of the Radical Right and the 
Contestation of Identities in Slovakia and the Visegrad Four. Geopolitics, Volume 23, Issue 4, 
2018, 754-780. 
5 Takis S. Pappas. Exchange: How to Tell Nativists from Populists. Journal of Democracy, Volume 
29, Number 1, January 2018, pp. 148-152 (150) 
leaders“6. From the empirical viewpoint, our approach does not necessarily contradict 
those who address populism as a form of anti-establishment politics. On the contrary, it 
is the performativity of populism, its “carnivalesque” and transgressive nature, the 
strategy of being deliberately shocking or rude which disrupts the normalcy or regularity 
of politics and thus allows it to wage war on the “establishment”.  
Therefore, populist discourses unfold within “systems of meaning, which are 
integrated by particular communicative codes”7. This relates populism to culture wars8 
replete with „mannerisms, gestures and aesthetic flourishes”9, which justifies the 
characterization of populism as a ‘style’ of politics“10, more emotive than normative, and 
always a matter of degree (there may be more or less populism in a specific discourse)11. 
Populism might therefore be defined as a “political style and the repertoires of 
performance that are used to create political relations”12, a mode of operating “rather than 
a self-sufficient set of ideas”13. 
Arguably, as a performative phenomenon populism manifests itself through 
discourses and imageries, rather than through substantive and politically coherent 
strategies. This approach is rooted in the concept of performativity and, more specifically, 
in its interpretation by Judith Butler and her multiple followers. In borrowing the idea of 
performativity from Butler’s philosophy of power, we approach identities as “cultural 
fictions”14; in other words, “after Butler, identities and belongings … can never be securely 
pinned down. They must be seen as fundamentally contingent, stabilized only through 
the performative acts that attempt, unsteadily, to fix them as integral markings of our 
existence”15. Guy Debord’s ‘society of the spectacle’ seems to be a good match to this 
theorizing. 
                                               
6 Alberto Martinelli. National Populism and the European Union. Populism 1, 2018: 59-71 (62) 
7 Ingolfur Bluhdorn and Felix Butzlaff. Rethinking Populism: Peak democracy, liquid identity and 
the performance of sovereignty. European Journal of Social Theory 2018: 1–21 (16) 
8 Jacques Rupnik. The Specter Haunting Europe: Surging Illiberalism in the East. Journal of 
Democracy, Volume 27, Number 4, October 2016, pp. 77-87 (82) 
9 Jonathan Dean & Bice Maiguashca (2020): Did somebody say populism? Towards a renewal and 
reorientation of populism studies, Journal of Political Ideologies, DOI: 
10.1080/13569317.2020.1699712 (5) 
10 Fabio Wolkenstein. What can we hold against populism? Philosophy and Social Criticism 2015, 
Vol. 41(2) 111–129 (112) 
11 Jasper Muis and Tim Immerzeel. Causes and consequences of the rise of populist radical right 
parties and movements in Europe. Current Sociology Review 2017, Vol. 65(6) 909– 930 (911) 
12 Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey. Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and 
Political Style. Political Studies 2014, vol. 62, 381–397 (387) 
13 Thomas Jacobs (2018) The Dislocated Universe of Laclau and Mouffe: An Introduction to Post-
Structuralist Discourse Theory, Critical Review, 30:3-4, 294-315 (318) 
14 Alan McKinlay. Performativity and the politics of identity: Putting Butler to work. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010): 232–242 (235) 
15 Lynne Segal. After Judith Butler: Identities, Who Needs Them? Subjectivity, 2008, 25: 381–
394 (381). 
Since political identities emerge “as neither foundational grounds nor fully 
expressed products”16, they are recurrently re-signified through rituals of repetition and 
reiteration17. In our analysis we assume that to qualify as performative, a social action (a 
speech act, a political of cultural gesture, or a public event) should be “repeated’’, ‘‘re-
enacted” and “re-experienced” within the already established set of meanings18. To add 
some semiotic perspective to this argument, we agree that “every sign can be cited, and 
consequently it can break with every given context, and engender infinitely new 
contexts”19. This presupposes that performative actions require publicity (as opposed to 
technocratic decision making behind closed doors of corporate institutions, parliaments 
or governmental agencies), that they should be replicable and reproducible in a variety of 
discursive forms, and should engender a certain narrative of resistance to - and 
subversion of - the dominant discourses of power. One may say that “reiteration is 
compulsory, but agency lies in the possibility of resignification, i.e. the reworking of the 
discourse through which subject effects are produced”20. 
Thus, populism as a political style creates political relations that entail “repertoires 
of embodied, symbolically mediated performances”21, involving actors, audiences, stages, 
scripts and mise-en-scene”22. In this sense, populist agendas are less about “policy 
content than … the form”23, and populism as a style is self-reproducing phenomenon with 
a broad variety of genres that might be inscribed into its frame, including “parodic 
recitations”24 and other performative forms. With the rise of populism, “many existing 
conventions (concerning politeness, conversation maxims, conventional norms and rules 
governing discussions, negotiations, conflict management and so forth) are increasingly 
being jettisoned in political debates… Apologies no longer seem necessary, insults are left 
                                               
16 Alecia Youngblood Jackson. Performativity Identified. Qualitative Inquiry, Volume 10 Number 
5, 2004 673-690 (675) 
17 Lise Nelson. Bodies (and Spaces) do Matter: The limits of Performativity. Gender, Place and 
Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography 6:4, 331-353 (338) 
18 Silvia Stoller. Expressivity and performativity: Merleau-Ponty and Butler. Continental 
Philosophical Review (2010) 43 :97–110 (102). 
19 Moya Lloyd. Radical Democratic Activism and the Politics of Resignification. Constellations 
Volume 14, No 1, 2007: 129-146 (131) 
20 Mark Laffey. Locating Identity: Performativity, Foreign Policy and State Action, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jul., 2000), pp. 429-444 
21 Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey, op.cit., p.36. 
22 Andrew Arato and Jean L. Cohen. Civil society, populism and religion. Constellations. 2017; 24: 
283–295 (286) 
23 Angelos Chryssogelos. State transformation and populism: From the internationalized to the 
neo-sovereign state? Politics 2018: 1-16 (10) 
24 Moya Lloyd. Performativity, Parody, Politics, Theory, Culture & Society 16 (2), 1999, p. 197. 
standing. People are obviously moving in different, totally segregated discursive 
worlds”25, thus causing divisive effects upon the society. 
Of paramount importance is that “ discourses are performative to the extent that 
they co-produce what they name and “claim to represent''26: they directly appeal to the 
people, skipping normal / regular institutional practices, and in the meantime they re-
signify the concept of the people in opposition to a variety of newly invented internal and 
/ or external ‘others’. In other words, “populist discourse is performative because the 
people do not exist independently of the claims to represent the people”27. In this vein 
indeed „the definition / naming of the ‘people’ by populism is a performative operation“28, 
and our case studies below appear to illuminate this argument further on.   
As could be seen from the literature review, our analysis is in no way the first to 
argue the performative nature of populism. We build it on a growing body of literature 
that has relied on the concept of performativity, and interpreted it in various empirical 
contexts and through different methodological lenses. Some29 have used a discourse 
analytical framework focusing predominantly on the usage of language while other 
studies have focused on visual rather than textual aspects of the performance.   While we 
share the general analytical premises with many of those studies, we contribute to the 
debate by broadening the empirical focus both by shifting it to Central and Baltic Europe, 
and by including other dimensions of analysis. For instance, while we certainly agree that 
charismatic leaders have been “a distinct mode of the performativity of populism”,30 
empirically our analysis transcends the idea of populism as a one man show, expanding 
to elements of performativity that are found in group actions and representations and do 
not necessarily hinge on a charismatic individual. 
 
Estonia: More than One Populism 
                                               
25 Ruth Wodak. ‘The boundaries of what can be said have shifted’: An expert interview with Ruth 
Wodak (questions posed by Andreas Schulz), Discourse & Society 2020, Vol. 31(2) 235 – 244 
(239). 
26 Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey. Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and 
Political Style. Political Studies 2014, vol. 62, 381–397 (389) 
27 Lasse Thomassen (2019) Representing the People: Laclau as a Theorist of Representation, New 
Political Science, 41:2, 329-344 (331) 
28 Neil Robinson and Sarah Milne. Populism and political development in hybrid regimes: Russia 
and the development of official populism. International Political Science Review 2017, Vol. 38(4) 
412– 425 (404)  
29 Mats Ekström, Marianna Patrona, Joanna Thornborrow. Right-wing populism and the 
dynamics of style: a discourse-analytic perspective on mediated political performances. 
Palgrave Communications, Vol. 4, Issue 1, pp. 83-83, 2018 
30 Angelos Kissas. Performative and ideological populism: The case of charismatic leaders on 
Twitter, Discourse and Society 2019, p.2; doi.org/10.1177/0957926519889127 
Populism became a buzzword in Estonian political parlance with the accession of 
a party named EKRE to the government as a coalition partner in April 2019, in the 
immediate aftermath of parliamentary election that more than doubled this party’s 
popularity, from 8,1 % in the previous election to 17,8 %.  
In the opinion of many Estonian political experts, “EKRE's rise in politics already 
has led to the vulgarization of public debate"”31. As an Estonian analyst concluded, “the 
national conservatives create one scandal after another that spark short-term media 
crises but also blow over relatively quickly. They sometimes include no-confidence 
motions in the parliament, while these are dismissed just as expediently… Frequent 
scandals that disappear as abruptly as they were created coming to nothing – it is a new 
logic we have not yet adjusted to”32. This is exactly how EKRE - without a direct 
attribution to the party - was portrayed in a critical video created by the Kõigi Eesti (‘All 
of Estonia’) group: as a gang of hooligans encroaching upon a big peaceful family and 
staging a mess insulting and attacking all the decent people gathered for a party33.    
Indeed, EKRE has a long record of performative appearances aimed more at 
transgressing the standards of political behaviour than at problem solving. In 2018 an 
EKRE member Mart Saarso has called Tallinn City Council chairman Mihhail Kõlvart “an 
Asian who is unfit for the hall at City Council”. Alluding to Kazakh roots of Kõlvart, he 
added: “The capital city is in the hands of migrants”34. In the public space like-minded 
youth organization – ‘Blue Awakening’, ‘Sovereign Movement Smart and Healthy Estonia’ 
and some others – had been particularly visible in organizing torch rallies35 on 
Independence Day36, along with anti-immigration “street patrols as a performative act of 
white militarized masculinity”37. Torch parades, popular with youth organizations before 
                                               






32 Analyst: New mode in Estonian politics, ERR, December 17, 2019, 
https://news.err.ee/1014858/analyst-new-mode-in-estonian-politics 
33 Kõigi Eesti seisab üksteist austava, hooliva, väärika ja võimalusterohke Eesti eest, 
https://koigieesti.ee 
34 EKRE member, Riigikogu hopeful Saarso calls Kõlvart 'unfit Asian', ERR, October 11, 2018, 
https://news.err.ee/868288/ekre-member-riigikogu-hopeful-saarso-calls-kolvart-unfit-asian 
35 Stefano Braghiroli and Vassilis Petsinis. Estonia’s populist and radical right: how radical are 
they? Open Democracy, December 18, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-
make-it/estonia-s-populist-and-radical-right-how-rad/  
36 Kutse tõrvikurongkäigule 2016 / Estonian torchlight march 2016. EKRE, February 1, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=to9IOd77FC4 
37 Sarai Aharoni and Élise Féron. National populism and gendered vigilantism: The case of the 
Soldiers of Odin in Finland. Cooperation and Conflict 2019: 1– 21 (2) 
the 1920s and 30s and closely associated with the Nazi symbols, are however perceived 
as metaphors “of light and freedom”38 among EKRE’s sympathizers.  
After the parliamentary election that brought 19 members of EKRE to the national 
legislature - as compared to 7 in 2015 - the space for populist performances expanded, 
thus triggering public outcries. Thus, the father and son Martin Helme and Mart Helme, 
two key figures in EKRE, while being sworn in to the Estonian Parliament, made gestures 
that appeared to be an "OK" sign with their thumbs and index fingers making a circle 
while their other three fingers were held out. Since 2017, the gesture has taken on new 
significance in white supremacist circles; according to the Anti-Defamation League, white 
supremacists use it to signal their support for white power39. A few months later EKRE 
member Ruuben Kaalep took a selfie with the same gesture, posing with the head of the 
French National Rally Marine Le Pen who was visiting Tallinn. Later she insisted he delete 
the picture from his Facebook page40; however, Martin Helme pledged to continue to use 
the gesture as a sign of defiance to “left-wing radicals who want to hijack the language.41” 
Another performative scandal was Estonian Interior Minister Mart Helme’s verbal 
offense of the new Finnish prime minister Sanna Marin: in December 2019 he 
characterized the new coalition government in Finland as an “evidence of leftist efforts to 
destroy the country from within … What has happened in Finland now still makes the hair 
stand on end"42.  “Now we see how one sales girl has become a prime minister and how 
some other street activists and non-educated people have also joined the cabinet,” Helme 
said on his party’s radio talk show, making the prime minister of Estonia apologize for 
this insult43. A few months later Estonian Ambassador to Finland Harri Tiido resigned 
due to his disagreements with the government in Tallinn; he particularly cited the episode 
with Mart Helme’s verbal attack on Sanna Marin: "They may think they are saying it … 
for domestic consumption. However, everyone gets to know everything nowadays, and if 
                                               
38 EKRE: ‘Inappropriate’ symbols not welcome at Independence Day torch parade, ERR, February 
23, 2016, https://news.err.ee/117680/ekre-inappropriate-symbols-not-welcome-at-
independence-day-torch-parade  
39 Rachel Frazin. Estonian lawmakers appear to make white power sign, The Hill, March 5, 2019, 
https://thehill.com/policy/international/europe/441956-estonian-officials-raise-concern-new-
lawmakers-flashed-white 
40 Aliide Naylor. Could right-wing populism push integrated Estonia toward Russia? EuroNews, 
May 22, 2019, https://www.euronews.com/2019/05/21/could-right-wing-populism-push-
integrated-estonia-back-towards-russia  
41 Jack Montgomery.  Populist revolt spreads: Estonia’s new government ministers oppose EU 
integration, Breitbart, May 20, 2019, 
https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2019/05/20/populist-revolt-spreads-estonias-new-govt-
minister-will-oppose-eu-integration/# 
42 ‘Reds’ trying to destroy Finland, says Estonian Interior Minister, ERR, December 16, 2019, 
https://news.err.ee/1014332/reds-trying-to-destroy-finland-says-estonian-interior-minister 
43 Estonia apologizes after minister taunts Finnish PM as ‘sales girl’, Reuters, December 16, 2019, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-estonia-finland-minister/estonia-apologizes-after-
minister-taunts-finnish-pm-as-sales-girl-idUSKBN1YK1Q2 
[Estonian] diplomats need to ask Finland for support, for example, after this type of 
statement, then it's going to be hard to approach them."44  
Very illustrative of EKRE’s performative style in politics is their members’ 
justification for trolling and fake accounts as communication tools. Thus, Ruuben Kaalep 
admitted that he has used a fake name to fool the editorial desk of the Eesti Päevaleht 
newspaper: this opinion piece, in his words, “was written from a dogmatically left-wing 
and liberal democratic position. It included harebrained accusations aimed against 
EKRE. The aim of the article was to show the dominant worldview in Estonian 
journalism»45. 
However, the lines of division charted by the right wing populism are not always 
well fixed. In a revealing public utterance, the Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid has 
lambasted a new political style in the parliament that legitimizes rudeness and distracts 
attention from policy making to mockery and nonsense, yet in the meantime clearly 
alluded to some kind of tacit solidarity between the different forces in the ruling elite. In 
her words, even decent proposals made by populists “are discarded, since they offend and 
gag all others. Particularly annoying is to see how the offender and the offended go for a 
coffee together, being confident of themselves, and failing to acknowledge the lack of 
policy decisions beneficial for Estonia”46. Indeed, EKRE is by no means the only source of 
performative populism on the Estonian political stage. The removal of the EU flag from 
the parliament building in June 201947 was a highly symbolic gesture of performative EU-
skepticism of which EKRE was one of major driving forces, but definitely not the sole one. 
Of particular salience are EKRE parallels with the Keskerakond party which for a long 
time has been propagating left-wing populism aimed at providing a counterbalance (state 
interventionism, higher pensions, a progressive tax system) to the rigid free-market 
reforms that dominated in the 1990s and 2000s48. Having proposed to form a coalition 
government with EKRE, Keskerakond extended its populist style to making clear that it 
                                               
44 Estonian ambassador to Finland resigns over worldview clash with government. ERR, August 
1, 2020, https://news.err.ee/1119484/estonian-ambassador-to-finland-resigns-over-worldview-
clash-with-government 
45 Martin Laine and Sander Punamae. EKRE sees no problem with trolling, Postimees, January 
17, 2019, https://news.postimees.ee/6501755/ekre-sees-no-problem-with-trolling 





47 Riigikogu opts to keep EU flag out of Toompea White Hall by one vote, ERR, June 12, 2019, 
https://news.err.ee/951537/riigikogu-opts-to-keep-eu-flag-out-of-toompea-white-hall-by-one-
vote 
48 Jeroen Bult. Estonia adrift: How a digital pioneer became a source of political anxiety - opinion, 
LRT, May 28, 2019, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1063301/estonia-adrift-how-a-
digital-pioneer-became-a-source-of-political-anxiety-opinion 
considers Russophone votes more as an electoral resource rather than a matter of 
principle. As Marje Lauristin remarked, “Helme very much reminds me of what we've said 
about Savisaar49 – that he created a father figure and those who needed one followed him. 
Helme is doing the exact same thing today – he is shaping a father figure, a brutal and 
powerful but reliable image of a protector, one who notices and defends the 
downtrodden”50. 
Moreover, many anti-EKRE gestures may ostensibly be performative. President 
Kersti Kaljulaid walked out of the ceremony during the swearing in of an EKRE politician, 
Marti Kuusik, as technology and foreign trade minister, who faced a series of domestic 
violence allegations and had to resign the next day51. In an even more performative move, 
Kersi Kaljulaid appeared at the oath ceremony in the parliament in a sweatshirt 
emblazoned with the slogan ''Sõna on vaba'' (“Speech is Free” ) because of the climate of 
increasing verbal attacks on Estonian journalists52, which was a clear signal of disdain of 
EKRE. Shortly afterwards Martin Jaanus composed a song under the same title53, thus 
contributing to cultural commodification of the President’s motto. 
Another clearly visible performative action was a series of  public demonstrations 
against the far right54 with ‘pink slime’ emblems55. The “pink slime” lexem, being initially 
EKRE’s insult aimed at its opponents, became a badge of pride of those who wished to 
visualize their belonging to the liberal community of Estonia. This ironic devaluation of a 
populist speech act is a typical performative gesture of semiotic re-appropriation of the 
sign and its drastic re-signification. 
Within this context one should also mention a series of public projects that have 
appeared as a direct reaction to EKRE’s nationalism and spilled over beyond the sphere 
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of institutional politics. A series of public expositions (in particular, “Ours” in Tallinn56 
and “Me koik oleme Tartus” (“We are all Tartu”), aimed at celebrating Estonia’s cultural 
diversity, were meaningful political acts grounded in resources of performativity. Another 
example is the ‘Kõigi Eesti’ project whose founders were listed among 12 outstanding 
Estonians in 201957. 
  Thus, as a result of EKRE’s accession to power the entire political space became a 
scene where right wing populism is counterbalanced or complemented by center-left 
(Keskerakond) and liberal (Kersti Kaljulaid) counter-performances. In fact, EKRE and its 
opponents and coalition partners exchange performative actions, and opposition to EKRE 
goes performative too, which supports the presumption that “that anti-populism becomes 
structurally like populism itself”58, and sustains our vision of populism as a trans-
ideological phenomenon whose bearers range from national traditionalists to 
cosmopolitan liberals.  
 
Slovakia:  on Elves, Fools, and Their Transgressions 
Slovakia’s demand for anti-establishment politics goes well beyond the reference 
period (2016-2019). As early as 2013 Marian Kotleba was elected governor in the Banská 
Bystrica region (Central Slovakia), where poverty and the problems of the marginalized 
Roma minority were acute. Kotleba’s previous political project was outlawed in 2006 by 
the Slovak Supreme Court for extremism. However, its successor, Kotleba-People’s Party 
Our Slovakia (ĽSNS), capitalizing among other things on the 2015 anti-immigrant 
sentiment in Slovakia59, made a breakthrough in the 2016 national election, winning 14 
out 150 seats in the Slovak National Council. The party remained a pariah in Slovak 
politics, as what made it untouchable was its veneration of the wartime authoritarian 
Slovak state (1939-1945), Germany’s satellite  which was complicit in deporting its Jewish 
citizens to Nazi death camps.60 This shocking legacy, however, did not prevent ĽSNS from 
enjoying electoral support. Thus, in the Slovak presidential elections 2019, managed to 
                                               
56 V parke Taamssare otkryta vystavka ‘Svoi’, Tallinn.ee,  May 22, 2019, 
https://www3.tallinn.ee/rus/Uudis-V-parke-Tammsaare-otkryta-vystavka-
Svoi?filter_otsing_uudis_rubriik_id=35 




58 Jan-Werner Muller. “The People Must Be Extracted from Within the People”: Reflections on Populism. 
Constellations Volume 21, No 4, 2014, 483-493 (491) 
59 See L. Kissová. The Production of (Un)deserving and (Un)acceptable: Shifting Representations of 
Migrants within Political Discourse in Slovakia. East European Politics and Societies and Cultures (2017), 
DOI 1-2410.1177/0888325417745127 
60 See also E. Harris. “Nation before democracy? Placing the rise of the Slovak extreme right into context”. 
East European Politics (2019), 1-21. DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2019.1667770 
secure over 10% of the national vote (222, 935 votes) in the first round, and winning in a 
number of smaller municipalities (an impressive result, considering he had to compete 
with other right-wing populists). Particularly astonishing and symbolic was the fact of his 
victory in Ostrý Grúň, a village in Central Slovakia that became the sight of a massacre in 
1945, when German anti-insurgence units retaliated by burning the village down and 
killing 64 of its inhabitants – including women and children.  
These electoral developments suggested that the anti-establishment feeling among 
some of Slovakia’s voters was strong enough to create increased demand for shocking and 
sometimes even ugly and transgressive politics, which went against the system at any cost.  
Political sociologists classified ĽSNS as an actor which - despite being represented in 
parliament - exemplified the ‘anti-system’ and not just ‘anti-establishment’ approach.61 
Indeed, ĽSNS had long been calling for direct democracy, implying that the current 
Slovak system of parliamentary democracy was to be replaced by something else. Outside 
of the electoral cycle ĽSNS engaged in several performances which can be interpreted as 
attempts to resignify the ‘people’, popular will and democracy. Inspired by the Brexit 
referendum, ĽSNS launched two petitions in 2016 for Slovakia’s exit from the EU and 
NATO.62  The initiative had zero chances of succeeding, considering Slovakia’s generally 
Euro-optimist orientation and its dependence on the West. As a performative gesture, 
however, it carried the symbolism of taking politics outside of the establishment walls and 
bringing it back to the people. ĽSNS installed a petition booth outside, in front of the 
Slovak parliament, and leading members of the party posed in front of it, appealing 
directly to the people rather than to institutions.  
Another performance that ĽSNS systematically relied on were the train patrols. 
ĽSNS had long capitalized on the issues of the marginalized Roma minority and 
criminality on Slovak trains. Until the practice was outlawed, ĽSNS was sending its people 
dressed in the green party T-shirts to serve as home guard or militia units that would 
patrol the trains. One of the symbolic functions of this performance could be seen as 
delegitimizing the current Slovak state in virtue of its inability to serve as security provider 
and maintain its monopoly on legitimate violence and reappropriating the basic state 
functions for ĽSNS.    
In yet another performance in 2017, Kotleba shocked the public at a gathering in 
Banská Bystrica when he gave out checks to impoverished families. While these donations 
were apparently meant to represent the party’s support for Christian or “family values”, 
which is part of their official agenda, it is the value of the checks (€1488) that carried 
additional symbolism.  Reportedly, Kotleba started practicing this when he was still a 
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governor of Banská Bystrica. This time, however, the allusion to Neo-Nazi agenda 
(through 88 which in the extreme right’s code language stands for Heil Hitler) had gotten 
him in trouble as he had to stand in court facing charges of extremism. 63  
ĽSNS performances did not only aim at undermining the establishment but also 
involved a search for tradition - which was sometimes clumsily invented - and 
authenticity - which on more than one occasion turned out to be fake. What could be 
considered theatrical in itself is the ĽSNS’s use of costumes such as the ritual wearing of 
uniforms deliberately similar to the uniform of the Hlinka Guard, a nationalist militia 
active during the times of the 1939-1945 Slovak wartime state (see note above).64 The 
1939-1945 wartime state is not officially celebrated in Slovakia and its legacy generally 
remains anathema to the liberal minded Slovaks. Thus ĽSNS’ rituals venerating it 
symbolically point beyond the country’s current political system, to an alternative state 
building project which, if judged by their discourse, should be something else than a 
liberal parliamentary democracy. 
In another widely discussed (and ridiculed) attempt, ĽSNS tried to inscribe 
themselves into the traditions of the century Slovak national revival by organizing a hike 
to the Kriváň mountain in the Tatras. In the 19th century, the climbing of Kriváň united 
many of the prominent father figures of the Slovak national revival movement which was 
active in what was then the Habsburg empire (after 1867 officially Austria-Hungary). The 
mountains are a powerful reference in the Slovak culture. Featured on both the state flag 
and in the anthem (opening line) they remain a token of national identity. The 
performance of climbing the Kriváň could be read as spiritual unification with the 
forefather revivalists which, at the same time, also symbolically moved politics beyond 
the walls of deliberative institutions and into the pre-political authenticity of Slovak 
nature. Sadly, for the performance, several hours after ĽSNS reported photos of it through 
social networks, it turned out that the hikers confused two mountains with a similar name 
(Kriváň and Veľký Kriváň). The actual 19th century site was located several dozens of 
miles away and presented a more challenging climbing route.65  Poor knowledge of 
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geography and history thus made the performance of authenticity and tradition a 
tragicomic failure.  
In sum, ĽSNS performances could be seen as both (an imitation of) a search for 
authenticity and tradition outside of institutionalized politics and, simultaneously, a 
direct appeal to the pre-political (and therefore authentic) people (“direct democracy”) - 
an appeal bypassing the institutions which are, from the populist viewpoint, corrupt and 
captured by the establishment. The concept of the people has played a prominent role in 
ĽSNS discourse.  They repeatedly emphasized their intent to protect and represent the 
“decent people” (“slušní ľudia”) - as opposed to the corrupt “system” and “villains” like 
Roma criminals, Islamic terrorists or the LGBT. 
Ironically, the same concept (“decency”) was used in the 2018 mass anti-
corruption protests - the most numerous in Slovakia since the anti-Communist Velvet 
revolution of 1989. Murder of the investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée in 
February 2018 caused a political earthquake in Slovakia, forcing the then prime-minister 
Robert Fico, whom many saw as the leader of a corrupt establishment, to retire and 
brought to life a new civic movement called “For a Decent Slovakia”.  Decency was also 
the main theme around President Zuzana Čaputová’s - which we do not analyze here in 
more detail because of the methodological frame we chose. Čaputová’s trademark 
politeness and her restrained, “decent” political style could be seen as an antipode to the 
impertinent and transgressive nature of many populist performances. Unlike her 
Estonian counterpart Kaljulaid, who famously appeared in parliament in a sweatshirt, 
Čaputová did not employ transgressive performative gestures. (Slovak political 
cartoonists dubbed her “a calm force”66).  Probably, the only distinctly unconventional 
thing she did after being elected was launching her own talk show broadcasted from the 
presidential palace through social media.  
However, the overall liberal narrative built around the Manichean and non-
ideological divide into the “decent” and - by implication-  the “non-decent” bore a degree 
of structural resemblance to the narrative juxtaposing “decent people” against the evil 
“system” which could be discovered in the extreme right-wing discourse. (For instance, 
Čaputová’s sympathizers  released an illustrated fairy tale  that featured “a girl Zuzana” 
who lived “in her grandmother’s garden of flowers” and saw herself as “a brave hero 
fighting on the side of the good”.)67  This could be seen as a trans-ideological struggle over 
the pre-political concept of decency, and hence, even here we discover indications that 
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populism as a style crosses ideological boundaries  that right-wing authoritarian populism 
has its counterpart in liberal or “elvish” populism.  
The trans-ideological character of populism has to do with the fact that performing 
allows this political style to construct shape-shifting political subjectivities which cannot 
really be pinned down as subjects in the traditional sense of the word, i.e. as entities with 
stable predicates. Our next Slovak case study demonstrates how performance and 
transgression allows populism to hold together an ideological variety of political forces 
without being pinned down.  
The 2020 Slovak parliamentary elections saw the sudden triumph of Igor Matovič 
and his Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO).  Starting from the 
threshold level of 5% just weeks prior to that OĽaNO surprised everyone by growing to be 
the campaign winner with 25, 02% and Matovič was entrusted by president Čaputová with 
forming the new government. 68And while many parties used clearly performative 
gestures during the 2020 campaign, Matovič has been known in Slovak politics as its 
enfant terrible and a performer par excellence, who loved disrupting the normalcy of 
political life with his repeatedly transgressive behavior. 
Unlike ĽSNS and other more recent populist newcomers, Matovič had been in 
Slovak parliamentary politics for a decade. His party’s name could in itself serve as a 
textbook example of an anti-establishment message: “ordinary people” (not “the elites”) 
and independent personalities.  Hence, Matovič’s rhetorical strategy was often built 
around lambasting establishment corruption rather than promoting a consistent 
ideological program.   At the same time, OĽaNO has been known for its turnover, 
attributed to its leader’s unrestrained behavior.    
With his excesses Matovič earned himself several symbolic nicknames, including 
Blaznovič   -  a portmanteau of his last name and the Slovak blazon, which can be 
translated as “madman” but also as “fool” or “jester”.  He was also known as “šašo z 
Trnavy”, “the jester from Trnava” (his hometown) or Zmatovič  (cf.  zmätok: confusion, 
disruption - so, literally, “one who wreaks havoc in parliament”).69  
In European culture the fool (jester) is both an important and deeply ambiguous 
figure. The primary function of the fool is to entertain the court by performing his tricks 
and making the king laugh. But also, the jester finds himself in a unique position of being 
able to speak the bare truth (however unpleasant and offensive) to everyone, that is, 
including the monarch. In that sense he is also a transgressive figure whose impertinent 
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behavior must violate the existing rules and standards of normalcy much in the same way 
a carnival performance does.   
Over the years leading to his triumph, the “jester from Trnava” developed a clear 
taste for political actionism, delivering shocking and impertinent performances which 
were also supposed to be seen by voters as acts of naming a spade a spade. In 2012 Matovič 
famously scandalized the parliament by emptying a bag of syringes on another MP’s head 
after the latter admitted to having used drugs in the past but argued controversially that 
“pure heroin brings less harm to the body”.70   
Many of Matovič’s performances were attempts to ridicule and publicly humiliate 
the ruling SMER-Social Democracy party which was becoming increasingly associated 
with corruption scandals and whose leader Robert Fico had to step down as prime 
minister in 2018 following the mass protests triggered by the murder of the investigative 
journalist Kuciak (see above). In 2016 the Trnava jester interrupted a parliament session 
by stretching out a large banner on which SMER’s minister of interior Robert Kaliňak 
(who was about to be fired on suspicions of real estate related corruption) was called a 
“criminal”.71  In another performance dedicated to the same corruption scandal, Matovič 
had his party members empty sacks full of (fake) euro banknotes in front of the 
parliament as he was delivering his speech.72 That performance was meant to visualize 
the amount of money  Kaliňak’s associate Ladislav Bašternák (sentenced to five years in 
prison in 2018) had stolen from the Slovak state. His vendetta on SMER sometimes came 
on the edge of physical violence. In 2019 Matovič interrupted the press conference of the 
party leader Robert Fico with his usual corruption call out poster performance, which led 
to some roughing with the SMER people who tried to push him away from the conference 
site.73    
Matovič also used performances to discredit and humiliate SMER’s coalition 
partners. In 2020, he stood in front of the parliament speaker Andrej Danko holding a 
poster that featured an arrow pointing at him and the words “He is wasted (drunk)”.74 
Rudeness became Matovič’s regular rhetorical instrument as he sometimes used the 
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words like “idiot”, “dick” (“čurák”) or “fucker” (“trtko”) against  his political rivals. He 
described the judge and  justice ministry undersecretary Monika Jankovská - who was 
later taken into custody facing corruption charges - as “mafia’s prostitute”.75  
Matovič thus had no problem demonstrating authenticity through obscene 
language and speeches delivered in a state of frenzy but also through other forms of 
transgressive emotionality - such as weeping on camera for example. His transgressions 
were meant to publicly challenge the hypocritical establishment by openly calling a spade 
a spade - the luxury that only a jester figure can typically afford.  
Reflecting on the similarities between performative populism in Estonia in 
Slovakia we can thus see several clear parallels from which we can generalize. Firstly, it is 
clearly a transgressive search for authenticity. Notably, this search tends to take us 
outside of the standard setting of institutional politics and into the authenticity of the pre-
political. Here, nature is one important reservoir of authenticity.76 More often than not, 
transgressions are also performed through rudeness or the use of obscene language (cf. 
“prostitute”, “salesperson”).  
Furthermore, performative populism also tends to be a transideological 
phenomenon. This has to do not only - or not so much -  with the fact that performances 
were associated to “hybrid” political subjects without a clear ideological physiognomy 
(OĽaNO). Like in the Estonian case, populists were also met with equally performative 
counter-gestures from opponents of the respective parties. For instance, shortly after the 
election of ĽSNS to Slovak parliament in 2016, two MPs came to work with yellow stars 
sewn to their clothes, explaining that this is how they wanted to warn of “the presence of 
fascists in parliament”. Characteristically, ĽSNS MP Uhrík called their performance “a 
circus”. 77 Obscenity and rudeness have also been used. Anti-ĽSNS  protesters in Košice 
(Slovakia’s second largest city) promised the “Kotlebists” “shit with poppy seeds” instead 
of votes (Hovno s makom Kotlebákom - a rhymed line in Slovak)78  and called them 
mentally ill in another rhymed line (Keby mali Tatry ústa, kričali by: tam je ústav - If 
the Tatra mountains had a mouth, they would be screaming: the psychiatric ward is over 
there!) . Protestors also used irony and trolling, alluding to the ĽSNS’ public blunders (see 
above), and thereby suggesting the party was culturally and geographically illiterate. 
Thus, they held signs saying: “I offer additional courses in Slovak language and history” 
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and “Kriváň 133 km” with an arrow pointing in the direction of the mountain ĽSNS 
previously failed to locate.79 
 
Conclusions 
Here are three main points we may infer from this comparative analysis. First, in 
both cases of Slovakia and Estonia populism is divisive, and fails to play a unifying role. 
Thus, the populist appeals to “the people” as a re-signified political subject turn into a 
false promise: with its heavy investments in transgressive politics and emotional 
imageries, populism fosters further polarization within societies and fragments national 
identities.   
Second, in both countries illiberal populists capitalize on the rhetorical external 
othering (Russia in the case of EKRE, and Hungary in the case of Slovakia). In the 
meantime, in recent years in Slovakia the image of Hungarians as the main enemies - 
which ethno-populists used to actively exploit – took a backseat to other strategies of 
othering, in particular turned against immigrants. Estonian right wing populism goes 
through its own dynamics of othering: EKRE have become less anti-Russian (in the way 
in which Slovak nationalists are basically silent about Hungary). 
Third, we have found out that populism as a performative phenomenon and a 
matter of political style is broadly dispersed all across the political spectrum. Populism 
usually connotes a search for authenticity beyond the sphere of institutionally regulated 
/ controlled politics, and in this regard lacks its ‘own’ institutional subject. The populist 
political style and mode of communication can be performed by different actors, from 
fascists to left liberals. Being used as an instrument for performative actions, it 
reproduces itself through multiple forms of transgressing the established practices and 
searching for some kind of indigeneity, or behavioral specificity. In the two cases of 
Slovakia and Estonia we have identified different modes of transgressive behavior, from 
the President's appearance in a T-shirt in the parliament to self-appointed street patrols.  
The search for authentic political forms can also take different shapes, all aimed at 
imagining, constructing and communicating with “the genuine” people adequately 
capable of representing the nation and its identity.   
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